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Abstract 
Despite repeated announcements of the end of ideology and the 
demise of religion during the 20th century, both play a crucial role in 
world politics today. This disjuncture between theoretical expectations 
and historical developments has its roots in conventional conceptions 
of ideology. While the latter grasp the representative nature of ideology 
as an expression of historical forces and political interests, they miss 
its constitutive role for modern politics. Based on an analysis of its 
historical origins and political implications, this article develops a new 
conception of ideology which accounts for the resilience and historical 
dynamics of ideological struggle. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, I 
show, liberalism has called ideology into being but lost control of its 
own creation.   
 






Herr, die Not ist groß! Die ich rief, die Geister, werd ich nun nicht 
los.1 
      Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
In Goethe's famous poem, the sorcerer's apprentice summons spirits 
he cannot control - and each attempt to stop them multiplies their 
powers. And so it appears to be with ideology and religion. Every 
pronouncement of the end of ideology or the demise of religion seems 
to breathe new life into ideological or religious struggle.  
 
In 1960, Daniel Bell declared 'the end of ideology'. 2  In developed 
Western societies, he argued, social democracy had resolved the 
problems generated by the industrical revolution which had given rise 
to the great 19th century ideologies - liberalism, Marxism, 
conservatism - and thus removed the basis for ideological struggles. 
But as soon as Bell made this announcement, the 1960s erupted into 
intensive ideological struggles: the civil rights movement in America, 
the student revolution in Europe, the Prague Spring in the Eastern 
Bloc, and a communist turn in national liberation movements and 
newly independent states in the Third World.  
 
Despite this sobering experience, in 1998 Francis Fukuyama once 
more proclaimed 'the end of mankinds ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government'.3 Like Bell, Fukuyama argued that liberalism had 
triumphed over its fascist and communist competitors because it was 
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capable of resolving all 'fundamental contradictions' within society - 
including religion. 4  Again, however, this proclamation was quickly 
followed by the rise of explicitly antiliberal movements on the left and 
on the right all over the world and revealed deep divisions - 
'fundamental contradictions' - within core liberal states themselves.  
 
Religion, too, defied similar predictions. While the widely influential 
secularization thesis held that the modernization of society would lead 
to the gradual demise of religion, today its revival in all parts of the 
world has given rise to debates about a postsecular society.5  This 
liberal conception of ideology and religion as a reflection of social and 
political tensions destined to be resolved in the course of historical 
development thus repeatedly misjudged their resilience. 
 
But realists did not fare much better. Seton-Watson held 50 years ago 
that world politics was driven by 'conventional state interest' and the 
intense ideological struggles of the interwar period were simply the 
result of the democratization of politics, and hence the need of 
professional politicians 'to explain politics in terms of simple moral 
issues', in a 'language easily intelligible' to the masses.6 State interest 
defined in terms of power was used to explain both the Cold War and 
its end, with ideology playing a secondary role. 7  And yet, radical 
changes in the professed state interests of Britain and the United 
States (US) today seem to have been triggered by shifts in the 
dominant ideology - rather than the other way around. 
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In both cases, ideology and religion are thus understood as reflections 
or expressions of underlying historical forces and political interests. 
These conceptions appear to miss, however, their role in constituting 
state interests and misjudge the dynamic rise, fall and revival of their 
historical development. Addressing these shortcomings in two steps, I 
will first provide an historical account of the role of ideology and 
religion in world politics between 1919 and 2019. It shows that while 
reflecting historical developments and political interests, ideology and 
religion also systematically constitute these forces and interests. In 
order to recover this constitutive dimension, I will then provide an 
analysis of the origins of the concept of ideology and its theoretical 
and political implications. Designed to justify the power of liberal 
forces, the concept of ideology provided a new epistemological basis 
for modern politics - forcing political struggle onto the ideological 
battlefield and (re)constituting political actors, principles, practices, 
and institutions, including religion. Unlike conventional approaches, 
the article concludes, this conception of ideology does account for its 
historical dynamics. 
 
Ideological politics 1919 - 2019  
Ideology and religion have played a pervasive and varied role in world 
politics over the past 100 years. Tracing this role confirms the 
conventional claims that ideology and religion reflect social and 
political developments and serve to justify state interests. But it also 
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shows that those developments and interests were themselves 
systematically constituted by ideologies and religions. 
 
The end of the First World War ushered in a period of intense 
ideological struggles, reflecting, as liberals hold, tensions and 
contradictions within and between societies: economic and social 
instability, political fragmentation, tensions between colonial powers 
and colonized populations as well as between the winners and the 
losers of the war. Yet while these tensions were indeed reflected in 
ideological fragmentation and struggle, they were also squarely 
attributed to liberal domestic and international policies. And it was 
the opposition to liberalism that constituted, shaped and 
strengthened competing political ideologies.  
 
Even before the war ended, revolution broke out in Russia and 
revolutionary movements and upheavals followed all over Europe as 
well as in Latin America, India, Indonesia, Turkey and China.8 The 
rise of communist and socialist parties reflected the economic 
hardships following the war. But their political aim was to replace the 
liberal capitalist order which was held responsible for both with a 
communist one.  
 
Similarly, conservative and religious forces reflected concerns about 
political instability and fragmentation. Blaming liberalism for these 
developments, they pursued the resurrection of traditional political 
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institutions and religious moral and social values instead. Fascism, 
too, reflected the concerns of demobilized soldiers who saw little 
chance of reintegration into an economically and politically unstable 
society. Fiercely antiliberal and anticommunist, fascism sought to 
replace the fragmented liberal political order with a strong populist - 
often xenophobic and racist - nation.9  
 
Concerned with the loss of religious moral and social values, in 
Europe religious forces worked largely in and through conservative 
movements and parties. In the colonies, the suppression of these 
values was blamed on the liberal colonizers and religious forces 
contributed to broad based anti-imperialist movements seeking to 
establish political independence and self-determination.  
 
While each of these political movements responded to a different 
problem and offered different solutions, all of them were shaped by 
their opposition to liberalism. And this common ground also provided 
the basis for temporary cooperations between otherwise radically 
different ideologies: between communism and fascism in Germany, 
between conservatism, religious forces and fascism in Spain, and 
between communism, conservatism, and religion in anti-imperialist 
movements. 
 
These ideologies, as realists correctly argue, were used to justify 
particular state interests and policies. In addition, however, their 
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models of social and political organization were based on universalist 
claims about the nature of society which translated into transnational 
and international cooperation and conflict. Communists expected the 
world revolution and established the Comintern in order to collaborate 
with (and dictate the strategies of) communist parties and movements 
around the world. Anti-imperialist movements, including formally 
independent states like China and many Latin American countries as 
well as African Americans, organized regular pan-African and pan-
Asian conferences.10 The right wing in the Spanish civil war received 
massive support from conservative and fascist movements, just as the 
left did from communist and socialist ones. Liberals cooperated in 
establishing the League of Nations, opposed communism through 
intervention in the Russian civil war and the propagation of national 
self-determination in Europe, and fought anti-imperialism in the 
colonies themselves as well as through the mandate system of the 
League of Nations.  
 
Moreover, in many cases ideological loyalty trumped loyalty to the 
nation. Communist parties followed Comintern policies even if they 
were not in the national interest; fascists found sympathizers and 
(later) collaborators in other countries; 'members of each people 
fought on both sides'; 11  liberals refused to enter an alliance with 
communist Russia against Nazi Germany on ideological, not national, 
grounds; and even in colonies threatened by Japanese imperialism, 
the latter found support on account of its anti-Western nature.12 
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If national interest nevertheless seemed to play a tremendously 
important role in these ideological struggles throughout the interwar 
period, it was because none of these ideologies was able to establish 
its hegemony beyond particular states: communists came to power in 
Russia, conservatives in Spain, fascists in Italy and later in Germany; 
liberals remained in power in Britain and France and the anti-
imperialist struggle in the colonies gained strength but without yet 
leading to independence.  
 
These ideologies were thus forced to realize their model of society 
within particular national contexts: from the abolition of private 
property and the establishment of Soviet councils in the Soviet Union 
(USSR) through the Hitler Youth and the introduction of racist laws in 
Nazi Germany, the (re)establishment of village councils and 
handspinning in India, the organization of populist working classes in 
Latin America, to the introduction of democracy and welfare in 
Britain. And by remodeling particular societies, these ideologies also 
reconstituted national interests. Hence, the Stalinist doctrine of 
'socialism in one country' was only developed in response to the 
failure of communist revolutions elsewhere - for the purpose of 
defending communism. Similarly, when the Nazis attempted to 
establish a racially pure Third Reich, first at home and then in 
occupied territories abroad, they were not realizing a German national 
interest but rather their fascist ideology through the power of the 
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German state. And when liberal states introduced welfare policies and 
democracy or propagated the principle of national self-determination - 
policies not previously associated with their national interests - they 
were defending a weakened liberalism against the threat of 
communism and anti-imperialism. Though such policies served 
national interests, those interests were themselves the product of 
ideology. 
 
Once particular ideologies had consolidated their power in different 
states, an uneasy settlement between nation states as well as between 
colonial powers and colonies characterized world politics in the 1920s. 
Yet again, it was the failure of the liberal capitalist world economy in 
the form of the Great Depression that strengthened competing 
ideologies and brought the Nazis to power in Germany. They first 
remodeled domestic society and then expanded through annexation 
and military aggression, implementing their ideological vision abroad. 
This exercise of power, however, fuelled resistance among liberals and 
communists who, eventually, bracketed their enmity and fought the 
axis powers together. Thus, it was the attempt to realize the fascist 
ideology internationally that led to its comprehensive defeat in the 
Second World War and strengthened liberalism, communism and 
anti-imperialism. 
 
Ideology and religion thus pervaded world politics between 1919 and 
1945. Yet, while these ideologies certainly reflected existing tensions 
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and were used to justify state policies, such conceptions fail to 
account for the fact that these tensions and interests were themselves 
ideologically constituted. It was the liberal ideology that was held 
responsible for the war and its consequences and against which all 
other ideologies mobilized. Wherever an ideology came to power, it 
transformed society and the state in its own image - and thus 
constituted the very state interests that were subsequently justified in 
ideological terms. Moreover, none of these ideologies was restricted to 
a particular national context; all of them shaped transnational and 
international cooperation and conflict. This productive role of ideology 
and religion continues throughout the Cold and post-Cold War 
periods. Tracing this development, moreover, provides valuable 
insights into the historical dynamics of their change, rise and fall. 
 
The ideologies that survived, strengthened by the Second World War, 
shaped the very structure of world politics during the Cold War: a 
liberal First World, a communist Second World, and an anti-
imperialist Third World. And in each case, it was the exercise of 
ideological power that generated resistance, constituted new ideologies 
and ultimately led to the dissolution of the Third World, the implosion 
of the Second World and the constitution of a liberal world order. 
 
While the defeat of fascism deprived liberalism and communism of 
their common enemy and revived the struggle between them, both had 
experienced an existential threat which was reflected in post-War 
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ideological adjustments. Liberals recognized that their laissez-faire 
economic policies had played a crucial role in creating inequality and 
thus directly strengthened their communist and fascist competitors. 
At the same time, welfare policies, the New Deal and wartime 
economics had all demonstrated the success of government regulation 
of the economy. Liberalism thus adopted social democratic forms of 
redistribution, the welfare state, and Keynesian economics.13  
 
Communists, meanwhile, recognized that revolutions in developed 
states were not imminent and that their temporary collaboration with 
fascism had put their survival at risk. Hence, communists now argued 
that the revolution could not be exported but had to wait until 
capitalism in the West broke down under its own contradictions and 
non-European societies had reached the necessary level of economic 
and political development. Until that time, the USSR had to defend 
socialism in one state.  
 
These revised ideologies were then systematically translated into 
domestic and international policies - shaping the societies in their 
respective sphere of influence. This involved the consolidation of 
liberal capitalist democracies in the West - through the Marshall plan 
and the drafting of liberal constitutions for Germany and Japan as 
well as the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions designed 
to institutionalize a liberal capitalist world economy. Confronting this 
liberal First World in the West, the USSR established a communist 
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Second World in the East. It socialized the economy and installed 
governments led by communist parties. It countered the Bretton 
Woods institutions with the establishment of Comecon. The public 
sphere in both camps was fed with anti-communist and anti-capitalist 
propaganda respectively. And both sides integrated and strengthened 
their respective sphere of influence with military alliances - the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. 
 
Both, moreover, understood themselves as competing concepts of a 
universally valid modernity which needed to be extended to the Third 
World 'to save the natives from ignorance, filth and the consequences 
of their own actions'. 14  The Third World thus became the most 
important battlefield in this ideological stand-off with ideological 
conceptions shaping the Third World policies of the US and the USSR. 
 
On the liberal side, modernization theories and policies were designed 
to integrate newly independent states into the liberal camp through 
economic aid and, where necessary, military intervention. 15  But 
fearing the spread of communism, the US consistently misinterpreted 
any deviation of Third World policies from its own model of 
modernization as an advance of communist influence - triggering a 
spate of US interventions: in Korea, China, Cuba, Lebanon, Congo, 
the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Iran and eventually 
Vietnam. This record of interventions in conjunction with the failure of 
US economic policies to lift Third World states out of poverty 
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eventually undermined liberal influence, provided the motivation for 
Third World cooperation, and pushed even anti-communist regimes to 
ask for military aid from the USSR.16  
 
Ironically, the ideological approach of the USSR did not fare much 
better. Convinced that no country outside Europe was developed 
enough to undergo a socialist revolution, it failed to provide support 
for communist movements in the Third World and thus squandered 
the initial sympathies of independence movements. By the time of 
Stalin's death, the USSR had almost entirely lost its standing in the 
Third World.17 
 
In the Third World, meanwhile, anti-imperialist movements largely 
fighting against liberal colonial powers - Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the USA - initially either tended towards 
the left or drew on native histories and religions. Both communists 
and nativists, however, were interested in modernization and 
economic and technological advance along Western lines. Almost all 
their leaders were Western educated modernizers18 trying to establish 
a modern nation state. Yet, in pursuit of this goal Third World leaders 
had to contend with the legacies of colonialism: warped domestic 
economies, an international economic order designed to serve the 
interests of the former colonial powers, rigid stratification and racism 
as well as borders that cut across ethnic and religious lines.  
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In this context, religion often played a crucial role in nation- and 
statebuilding policies. In some cases, like Sri Lanka, Buddhism 
provided the basis for nationbuilding, thus marginalizing the Hindu 
minority and eventually leading to a brutal 30 year civil war. In other 
cases, like India, it led to separation and the constitution of two 
independent states and ongoing conflicts between India and Pakistan. 
In yet other cases like Turkey, China, or Guinea, modernizing elites 
viciously suppressed religion as a barrier to national integration and a 
modern secular state.19 That Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a 
Hindu nationalist and Prime Minister Bandaranaike by a Buddhist 
monk was thus no accident.  
 
The consolidation of the Third World as a meaningful political concept 
reflected these common challenges and was fuelled by a string of US 
interventions that smacked of a continuation of imperialism. Third 
World solidarity and cooperation developed. At the Bandung 
conference, principles of non-alignment were formulated and laid the 
foundations for economic cooperation that would later lead to the 
establishment of OPEC.20  
 
Just as during the interwar period, each of these ideologies reflected 
particular social and political interests and were used to justify 
policies. But all of them also shaped domestic and international 
policies thus constituting political actors from states and international 
organizations to the First, Second, and Third Worlds - and hence the 
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very structure of the international system. Moreover, all of them 
defined themselves in opposition to other ideologies underpinning the 
struggle between them. Crucially, however, their demise in the course 
of the 1960s was not triggered by competing ideologies from without 
but rather by internal resistance. In the Third World, internal 
oppression, the failure of economic and technological development, 
ongoing imperialism and the Sino-Indian war undermined the 
modernizing ideologies of the first generation of Third World leaders 
and the solidarity of the non-aligned movement.21 In the liberal camp, 
it was racism, the suppression of communist and socialist political 
movements (McCarthyism), and the power politics of the Vietnam war 
that led to the civil rights movement in the US; ongoing British rule in 
Northern Ireland that led to the Troubles; the continuing influence of 
Nazis and the suppression of communist parties in West Germany 
that fed the student revolution of 1968. And in Eastern Europe, 
dissatisfaction with the Soviet model generated competing movements 
in the Prague Spring, Poland and Yugoslavia. Contra Bell, then, the 
consolidation of ideological power did not indicate the end of ideology 
but triggered a revival of ideological struggle in all three cases. 
 
These challenges were again reflected in ideological shifts. Inspired by 
the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, anti-imperialist movements in 
Southern Africa moved towards the left and Third World solidarity 
now focused on economic issues like the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO).22 After the death of Stalin, the Soviet ideology shifted 
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away from its rigid refusal to support Third World independence 
movements and began to provide training, weapons and supplies.23 
And in the West itself, 1968 led to a cultural revolution highly critical 
of liberalism's paternalist domestic and international policies.  
 
Yet, while the Soviets now accepted the possibility of socialist 
development in the Third World, they nevertheless assumed that it 
had to follow the Soviet trajectory. Their advisers thus rigidly tried to 
impose their own vision in radically different circumstances - and 
were in response regularly ignored by their local allies: in Angola, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, Afghanistan.24 Unable 
to conceive left-leaning movements in the Third World as the 
expression of local political forces and misinterpreting Soviet support 
as an aggressive export of communism, the US now distinguished 
between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. While the former were 
seen as capable of internal reform, the latter required outside 
intervention.25 Reagan thus launched a new counter-offensive against 
Soviet influence in the Third World which, however, following the 
Vietnam disaster, took the form of supporting local, often brutal, 
counter-revolutionary movements and dictators: in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Grenada, Afghanistan.  
 
By the end of the 1970s, both communist and capitalist 
modernization programs in the Third World had largely failed and 
American interventions as well as Soviet military aggression in 
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Afghanistan undermined the standing of liberalism and communism. 
These failures in conjunction with the often brutal suppression of 
religion on the part of modernizing elites led to a revival of religious 
forces - most prominently in the Iranian Revolution. This ascendance 
of religion, however, did not indicate a return to the traditional clergy 
which Khomeini fought as backward, stupid, pretensious, and 
reactionary.26  Instead, religion provided an alternative Third World 
centered basis for development.  
 
This revival of religion was neither restricted to Islam nor to the Third 
World. It found expression in the Afghan mujaheddin and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as Hindu nationalism in India, the 
Yugoslav wars in Europe and is today reflected in the Turkish 
government, the brutal Buddhist assault on Muslims in Myanmar and 
the pursuit of a 'Christian democracy' in Hungary.27  
 
In the West, meanwhile, the embedded liberalism of the post-war 
period was dismantled and the Bretton Woods institutions reoriented 
along monetarist and market ideology lines. These neoliberal 
economic policies led to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and 
conditionality in the Third World and the end of the social democratic 
version of liberalism in the West. In the East, the Soviet economic 
system imploded and undermined the standing of the communist 
ideology for some time to come. 'By the end of the 1980s the Third 
World had ceased to exist as a meaningful political or economic 
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concept'28 and the Second World all but disappeared - leaving behind 
a globalized liberal world order. 
 
Yet again, liberalism's largely uncontested power did not prove, as 
Fukuyama argued, that its 'theoretical truth is absolute and could not 
be improved upon'.29 On the contrary, it was precisely the exercise of 
this liberal power that generated resistance and strengthened 
competing ideologies. The belief that now at last the liberal vision 
could be realized worldwide30 underpinned foreign policies designed to 
export liberal principles, practices and institutions. Capitalism was 
rolled out to the former communist countries in East Central Europe 
and Russia, as well as being imposed, via conditionality, on Third 
World countries. The welfare state was further dismantled in the 
Western world and the WTO established to further the liberalization of 
the capitalist world economy. Democracy was promoted through aid, 
diplomatic and economic pressure and, in extreme cases, military 
intervention. It also formed a crucial part of peacebuilding 
operations. 31  Respect for human rights was pursued through the 
development of humanitarian law and the establishment of the ICC as 
well as through humanitarian interventions.32 The European Union 
(EU) and NATO expanded eastward - eventually right up to the 
Russian border.  
 
But instead of delivering general economic prosperity, the introduction 
of market economies in the East and the global South led to 
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increasing inequality. The dismantling of the welfare state had the 
same result in Western societies.  And the liberalization of the world 
economy eventually culminated in the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Democracy promotion most commonly led to the emergence of 
'illiberal' or 'authoritarian' democracies. 33  Instead of appeasing 
domestic conflict, the introduction of democracy in civil war situations 
often exacerbated it. 34  And humanitarian interventions failed to 
prevent massive human rights violations - for example in Somalia, 
Bosnia, Libya.35 Liberal assumptions, in short, were not confirmed by 
these developments.36  
 
Crucially, however, it was the liberal belief that still-existing 
ideological competitors were destined for the dustbin of history and 
one therefore did not have to pay attention to any remaining 'crackpot 
messiahs' 37  - whether in Russia or the global South - that 
underpinned the pursuit of these liberal foreign policies with 
arrogance and hubris.38 It blinded liberal forces to the fact that the 
exercise of power as such - represented in open propagation of a new 
imperialism during the 1990s39 - would generate resistance and fuel 
old as well as constitute new competing ideologies.  
 
For the first time in a long while, Third World states - led by the 
economically successful BRICs - cooperated in their resistance to 
further economic globalisation in the Doha Round. African states 
began to withdraw their support from the ICC, citing racist bias. 
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Russia pursued openly antiliberal domestic and international policies. 
Antiliberal populist forces - of the right and the left - came to power in 
Venezuela, India and Turkey. Older religious ideologies were 
transformed into transnational activist groups40 - explicitly fighting 
liberal interference in Middle Eastern politics - and taking this fight 
successfully into the heart of liberal, African and Asian states, from 
New York through Madrid and Mali to Indonesia. And in liberal states 
themselves, antiliberal populist forces on the right and on the left 
gradually increased their influence and eventually gained power in 
America and dictating British domestic and foreign policies since the 
Brexit referendum. These forces are also on the rise in other liberal 
states and constitute a serious threat to the future of the EU. For the 
time being, therefore, this revival of ideological struggle has put an 
end to the liberal world order. 
 
Taking stock of the role of ideology and religion in world politics over 
the past 100 years highlights that conventional conceptions tend to 
overlook their productive role: ideologies and religion produce the very 
tensions and contradictions they subsequently come to reflect, and 
they constitute the very actors, interests, and policies they 
subsequently justify. Most importantly, however, this failure to 
recognize the constitutive role of ideology and religion underpins 
systematic misjudgements of their historical dynamics. A more 
accurate assessment of the role of ideology and religion in world 
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politics thus requires a reconceptualization that accounts not just for 
their representative but also for their productive functions. 
 
Origins and logic of ideology 
The concept of ideology provides an ideal starting point for the 
analysis of its productive functions because (unlike religion, for 
example) we can pinpoint its historical origins. This section thus 
investigates the historical origins of the concept of ideology and 
provides an analysis of its theoretical and political implications.  
 
The term ideology was invented by a group of liberal thinkers who, in 
the context of the French Revolution, were fighting against the power 
of the Church on the one hand and the terror of the revolutionary mob 
on the other. They argued that ideas were ultimately rooted in 
material foundations. This epistemological claim allowed the 
idéologues, scholars of the logic or science of ideas, to expose religious 
thought as prejudice and superstition serving the particular interests 
of a corrupt clergy - in contrast to liberal principles like individual 
freedom, private property, constitutional government and free markets 
that were derived from a proper empirical grasp of the nature of 
society and thus provided the basis for a universally valid political 
order.41  
 
The epistemological claim that ideas are ultimately rooted in physical 
nature and not derived from God or authoritative scriptures was in 
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itself not new but drew on prior arguments developed, for example, by 
Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Descartes.42 But when liberal forces won 
this struggle and ended up in political power, they did not just replace 
particular political actors and projects in power. They replaced the 
epistemic basis of political power itself - which was not any longer 
justified with reference to God's law but rather by an accurate 
representation and realization of the nature of society - with radical 
implications.  
 
For once political power is justified with reference to a correct grasp of 
the nature of society itself, it can only be contested by driving a wedge 
between this model of society and the reigning political principles, 
practices, institutions, and actors. Political discontents, in other 
words, have to show that the dominant political organization does not 
'fit' the needs and interests of society, and must propagate an 
alternative conception of society and political order with a better 'fit' - 
that is, an alternative ideology. By justifying their power with 
reference to the epistemological claim embedded within ideology, 
liberals redefined the 'playing field' upon which all politics operates - 
including liberal politics itself.  
 
The theoretical implications of this epistemological shift are borne out 
by the subsequent development of the term ideology itself. Turning the 
concept of ideology against its liberal progenitors, Marx argued that 
the liberal model of society was not universally valid but served the 
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particular interests of the bourgeoisie in capitalist relations of 
production. 43  Challenging this liberal power thus required the 
development of an alternative, in this case communist, model of 
society. Instead of describing the study of ideas, ideology now denoted 
a set of ideas - a world view - designed to justify a particular social 
and political order.  
 
In this pejorative sense, ideology was subsequently widely used as a 
political weapon and characterized political discourse. This diffusion 
led to the point, as Karl Mannheim argued, where it was ‘no longer 
possible for one point of view and interpretation to assail all others as 
ideological without itself being placed in the position of having to meet 
that challenge’.44 Marxist, socialist, or communist positions were just 
as ideological as their liberal, conservative, or fascist counterparts.  
 
The claim that ideas are rooted in material contexts ultimately implied 
that all ideas have such roots and could be attacked on those 
grounds. Consequently, as Zizek argues, claims to the end of ideology 
express the height of ideological fantasy - regarding other positions as 
ideological and one's own as beyond politics.45 The epistemological 
claim underpinning the concept of ideology thus implies that there 
can be no non-ideological politics. It turns politics per se into 
ideological struggle. 
 
Politically, this epistemological shift had four crucial implications. 
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First, ideological power shapes political practices and institutions. The 
justification of power with reference to an empirically correct model of 
society drives the dominant forces to realize that model, to establish 
that 'fit' between their claims about society and the conditions on the 
ground. Hence, where liberal forces moved into the centre of politics in 
the course of the 19th century, they established constitutional 
government, the rule of law, protection of private property, voting 
rights for property owners, universal primary education, modern 
research Universities - in short, the modern nation state and with it 
that state's national interest. And, as we have seen in the previous 
section, 20th century ideologies followed the same logic wherever they 
came to power: protecting private property or socializing it, 
suppressing religion or introducing religious laws, expanding 
citizenship rights or excluding races, sexes, religions, ethnicities. The 
very states whose interests Seton-Watson juxtaposed to ideology were 
thus themselves the product of ideology.46  
 
Secondly, the ideological justification of power transforms traditional 
political forces into ideologies and constitutes new ideologies. While 
political power during the ancien regime was justified with reference to 
the grace of God, conservatives now argued that authority and 
hierarchy were in line with the organic nature of society and thus 
called for the conservation of traditional institutions like monarchy, 
religion, parliamentary government and property rights. And these 
goals were now pursued through conservative political parties.47 
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Religion, too, was fundamentally transformed in this process. By 
replacing religious thought as the epistemological basis of social and 
political power, liberal ideology separated 'lived religion as practiced 
by everyday individuals and groups'48 from religion as the basis of 
political power. Prior to the 19th century, the term religion was barely 
used in European discourses. Instead, 'the broad idea of moral values, 
traditional customs, and spiritual sensibility' underpinning the social 
and political order were captured by terms like 'tradition', 
'community', and 'faith' while the distinction between 'religion' and 
'secularity' described different kinds of clergy within the Church. This 
relative absence of the term 'religion' indicates its pervasive and 
foundational role in society while the modern concept of religion in the 
narrow sense of religious institutions and beliefs in contrast to secular 
social values is the result of the separation of religious thought from 
political power.49 
 
But this expulsion of religion from political power did not, as the 
secularization thesis holds, lead to a clear separation of secularism 
and religion. Instead, by replacing faith as the epistemological basis of 
political power, ideologies took on decidedly religious functions. The 
French revolutionaries propagated the 'religion of reason' and 
designed appropriate rituals. Ideologies provide the social and political 
order with its raison d´être and, just like religion, offer 'doctrine, myth, 
ethics, ritual, experience, and social organization'. 50  Religion, 
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meanwhile, was now forced to pursue political power like other 
ideologies - by offering a competing model of society. The shifting 
power relations between liberal ideology and religion thus transformed 
the former into political theology and the latter into theological 
politics.51  
 
In Europe during the 19th century, this modern form of religion fought 
liberal power largely through conservative political parties. 'Christian' 
parties were active in many countries throughout the 20th century 
and today the Hungarian prime minister Victor Orban explicitly aims 
to establish 'an old-school Christian democracy' despite the fact that 
Hungary is one of the least religious countries in Europe.52 In the 
colonies, religious forces contributed to anti-imperialist independence 
movements and subsequently often played a crucial role in 
nationbuilding: from Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and 
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabi to the current rise of Hindu nationalism in 
India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and the Islamic State. And 
with the ascent of transnational forms of power in the context of 
globalization, religious ideologies, too, take on transnational forms of 
organization and operation - prominently in the case of Al Qaeda. Like 
other ideologies, then, in the modern context religious forces 
constitute political parties, states, militias, terrorist groups and shape 
domestic and international policies. And like other ideologies, they do 
not only reflect the existence of religious populations but often aim to 
produce them - whether in Khomeini's Iran or Orban's Hungary. While 
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the lived religion practiced by individuals and groups is thus not 
necessarily linked to political projects, understanding religious 
political forces as ideologies accounts for the weaknesses of the 
secularization thesis: the continuing public role of religion even in 
utterly modern states like America and the dynamics of its historical 
rise and fall in response to other ideologies.  
 
The ideological justification of power, however, does not just transform 
traditional political forces into ideologies, it also constitutes new ones. 
The liberal pursuit of industrialization and its protection of private 
property led to mass migration from the countryside into towns, 
ruthless exploitation and poverty that resulted in widespread social 
and political upheaval culminating in the revolutions of 1848. This 
was the context in which Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto - 
highlighting the disjuncture between liberal rule and the conditions 
on the ground, and developing an alternative communist ideology with 
the aim to mobilize, integrate and guide political action against the 
bourgeoisie. Communism was thus a direct product of the dominant 
liberal ideology and developed throughout the 20th century in 
response to the rise and fall of liberalism. 
 
Third, ideological justification of power is based on a universally valid 
model of society and therefore generates expansionist tendencies. 
Theoretically, the liberal model of society was based on empirical 
'evidence' about the state of nature derived from indigenous societies 
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in the context of the colonization of America.53 And politically, these 
epistemological claims were used to justify liberal colonialism. Political 
rule, James Mill argued, had to be based on 'the most profound 
knowledge of the laws of human nature' and 'the most perfect 
comprehension of the principles of human society' - and since such 
knowledge was held by the British and violated by Hinduism, it was 
the British who had to exercise political rule in India.54 Throughout 
the 19th century European imperialism was justified largely in liberal 
terms 55  and in the process stimulated alternative anti-imperialist 
ideologies in the colonies. 56  Similar arguments underpinned the 
justification of the mandate system, modernization policies and the 
entire gamut of interventions - economic (conditionality), political 
(peacebuilding, statebuilding), normative (humanitarian) - in the 
global South after 1989. 
 
Finally, and crucially, once unleashed, ideological politics takes on a 
life of its own. While political power may be justified in terms of its 
alignment with the nature of society as such, the exercise of this 
power immediately contradicts that claim: where that power has to be 
imposed, it highlights a gap between the natural development of 
society and political rule. The exercize of ideologically constituted 
power thus feeds resistance and strengthens competing ideologies, 
breathing new life into ideological struggle. It led, in the 19th century, 
to the constitution of communism, conservatism, anti-imperialism 
and religious ideologies designed to fight liberalism - followed in the 
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20th century by fascism. Similarly, the exercise of communist power 
during the Cold War led to the Prague Spring, that of secular anti-
imperialists to the revival of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic nationalism, 
and the exercise of liberal power today to the revival of communism, 
fascism and religious ideologies. In direct contradiction to 
conventional assumptions, the exercise of ideological power does not 
signify its alignment with historical forces and the end of ideological 
struggle57 but serves to invigorate it.  
 
By the end of the 19th century, liberal forces had managed to 
establish themselves in power in most European states. Capitalist 
interests were prominently represented in government and had 
created a world market in which Britain enforced free trade. Almost all 
non-European territories had been integrated into liberal empires. 
And liberal values like distrust of dictatorship, a commitment to 
constitutional government, the rule of law and citizenship rights as 
well as the belief in reason, public debate, education, science were 
widely taken for granted. 58  Economic interdependence and 
international cooperation appeared to be so successful that Norman 
Angell argued war had become irrational.59 But it was precisely that 
power and its worldwide exercise that made war seem attractive to 
those who did not wield it, bringing down the first liberal world order 
in the trenches of the First World War. And it is the second liberal 
world order, arising from the end of the Cold War, that has generated 





Ideology, in sum, plays such a pervasive role because it provides the 
universal grammar of politics in a liberal epoch. Ever since liberal 
forces invented the concept of ideology and used its epistemological 
claim to justify their exercise of power, politics itself has taken the 
form of ideological struggle - turning traditional belief systems, 
including religion, into competing political programs, most obviously 
in the form of party politics. 60  Communism, conservatism, anti-
imperialism, fascism and religious ideologies were all formulated in 
response and opposition to liberal power. And all of them attempt to 
realize their model of society once in power: constituting political 
actors, interests, institutions and policies. Yet this very act of 
implementing ideological programs generates resistance and 
strengthens competing ideologies. Ideological politics thus reproduces 
itself.  
 
This constitutive dimension of ideology for modern politics explains 
the dynamics of the rise, fall, and revival of ideological struggle. And it 
is the failure to grasp this dimension that underpins the frequent 
misinterpretations by liberal and realist writers. The 'end of ideology' 
thesis can be substantiated by historical developments only if those 
developments are not themselves the product of ideological politics. 
And state (or other) interests can be contrasted with ideological 
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justifications only if they are not themselves the product of ideological 
politics. In fact, however, the revival of antiliberal ideologies today is 
the product of the liberal world order.  
  
Liberalism is thus quite literally the mother of all ideologies. But 
having unleashed the spirit of ideological politics, the latter develops 
in accordance with its own internal logic. Not only has liberalism, like 
the sorcerer's apprentice, lost control of its own creation; every 
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